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Ontology and Perception
Abstract
The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to
what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language
can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such
as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our
linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are
facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex
environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete
instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that
devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment
underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The
following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also
provide a window to our cognition of such entities.
General Introduction
Lying at the center of this article is the claim that the study of ontology ought to begin with what is
perceived rather than what is said. Researchers who are interested in ontology should take as their
starting point what is given in the perceptual field rather than what nouns are present in a given
language. Some ontological research begins and ends with an analysis of the relationship between a
language and its speakers (see for example see Lutz, Riedemann, and Probst (2003), Kayed and Colomb
(2002), and Wielinga, Schreiber, Wielemaker, and Sandberg (2001)). There are, however, general
problems associated with language that should warn us from investing too much in the implications of
what nouns appear in a given language. One such general problem is found in the seemingly simple
distinction between mass nouns, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, and count nouns, such as ‘human’ or ‘pen’.
Some nouns are difficult to place on one side or the other of this distinction. One such noun is ‘glass’,
which can be used to refer to an object capable of containing liquids or as a material that composes
several such objects. The mass-count distinction is the subject of the section that immediately follows.
Fortunately, for those who are interested in the ultimate source of the distinctions drawn within any
ontology, we have recourse to some provocative research into infant object perception. Such research
indicates that there is a primitive distinction to be made between objects, entities which are coherent
wholes, and materials, entities which lack coherence. This is a primitive distinction for the very fact that
the infants who seem to make it do so without any significant understanding of the linguistic distinction
between mass and count nouns. Next, attention will be given to what is needed on the side of human
perceivers in order to not only draw such a distinction, but to use it during daily interaction with the
world. It will be argued that we need two types of concepts in order to negotiate our way through the
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world. On the one hand we need concepts in order to track real world instances, such as particular buses,
walls, and drops of water. On the other hand, we need concepts that are general in the sense that they can
be used to recognize that a completely new instance, as when occurs when I am introduced to a new
person, belongs to the same class as previously encountered instances. In addition to concepts, we also
need to investigate what sorts of rules must be present in order for human subjects to so readily
discriminate between objects and materials at such an early age. Such rules must be receptive to surface
properties such as color, shape, and texture in order to begin to explain the discriminatory behavior of the
infants in the psychological tests cited below. Subsequent to this discussion, the relations among rules
and concepts, respectively, will be explored.
The Mass-Count Distinction
It is important to keep in mind that the mass-count distinction is first and foremost a linguistic one. Quite
simply, there are mass nouns, such as ‘water’, which refer to matter, or more colloquially, stuff, while
count nouns, such as ‘car’, refer to objects. We may be asked to count the number of cars in the parking
lot and understand just what this task means. But can we count the number of waters on the table? Are
we to count the water in the glass as a unified whole and the small area of water that collected beside it
as another? In order to make linguistic sense of the task of counting waters, we would have to add some
sort of count term in front of the mass noun ‘water.’ So we may be asked to count the areas or puddles of
water on the table which admit counting.
However there is a series of issues which can result in the dissolution of the mass-count distinction.
First of all, how are we to determine mass from count nouns? It is clear that whether a noun can be
made plural and still make grammatical sense is not an adequate criterion of differentiation.
Consider words such as ‘news’ or ‘woods’ and immediately one obtains a grasp of the difficulty of
maintaining the distinction. Despite the ‘s’ at the end of these words, in English they function as
singular nouns. For example, to relay bad news we say, “The news is bad.”. Further, words that at
first glance appear to be of the mass variety also seem to be able to be readily counted. For
instance, I may pass two separate ‘woods’ on my way to grandma’s house. In addition, in a
restaurant I may easily order two ‘waters’ and have my order understood by the server who has
heard it. One may claim that with respect to the latter example that ‘waters’ is an abbreviated form
of ‘glasses of water.’ Ware suggests that we define the distinction according to the type of
quantifiers and determiners that are used in front of the two types of noun (1979). This seems
plausible but undesirable in that we want the distinction to be applicable to nouns, not to noun
phrases. The issue is whether mass nouns divide the reference in a different way than count nouns.
In order to attempt to answer this question we need to set aside quantifiers and determiners and deal
with them separately.
Another possible criterion that could be used to maintain the mass-count distinction is to hold that
the two differ according to what they refer to. So, as Cartwright explains, count nouns refer to
individuals while mass nouns such as ‘water’ refer to stuff (1979). This suggests that there is a
genuine ontological distinction that corresponds to the linguistic one. But, we may certainly ask
whether mass nouns use a different referring mechanism than count nouns. In other words, when we
say ‘milk is a good source of calcium’, it appears as though we are not intending to refer to a
discrete mass of milk but rather to a type of matter. The question seems to be whether milk in this
sentence refers to a different kind of entity than ‘man’ does in this sentence: ‘man is an animal.’
And if so where does this difference rest? Is it an ontological difference having to do with the
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/galko.html[9/18/2009 5:07:59 PM]
nature of being of that which is referred to? Or is the difference found in the way we think about
what they name?
In addition, what can we say of cases where it is not clear whether we are referring to a type of
matter or a particular collection of matter? When a person who is gasping for breath says quite
simply, “water”, is he referring to a type of matter or an instance?
Quine’s Body-Mindedness
There are several issues that could be raised based on the observation that mass nouns can be
classified according to whether they refer to an instance of matter or they refer to a type of matter.
First and foremost, we may ask how we come to form types of anything. A concomitant topic
consists in whether types exist in the world or only in the minds of human observers.
Perhaps all we have is a world of individuals. If so, it is unclear whether such a world includes
discrete instances of matter and what individuating criteria can be applied to matter in such a way as
to result in discrete instances. Moreover, matter has the additional problem of not being a body in
the sense of Quine (1974). At stake is the relationship between the cognitive representation of
matter and Quine’s observation that human beings are instinctively body-minded. If we accept the
claim that there are representational advantages bestowed upon bodies, what does this mean for the
representation of matter?
Let us begin to address this latter question by first attempting to describe the presence of the matter
concept and its role within human cognition. What I suggest is that we look upon the matter
concept in much the same way as the object concept. However, there is a fundamental difference
between the two. This difference is first noticed in psychological experiments conducted on infants,
and it is appropriate for us to note the results from such experiments as they shed light upon how
basic the distinction between matter and object actually is.
There are many experiments (for example, Baillargeon et al. 1985; Chiang and Wynn, 1997; and
Huntley-Fenner et al., 2001) which show that while infants readily track objects, such as toy cars
and rubber ducks, they fail to track discrete instances of matter, such as sand or gel. The literature
regarding infant object recognition (Spelke 1994) suggests that the reason for this is that instances
of matter lack certain principles or properties that objects possess. According to Carey and Xu
(2001, p. 207) infant experiments on object recognition point to the following conclusion:
These infant studies suggest that the object tracking system is just that: an object tracking
system, where object means 3D, bounded, coherent physical object. It fails to track
perceptually specified figures that have a history of non-cohesion. (Emphasis in original
work).
An example of this is found in two experiments (Baillargeon et al. 1985, Chiang and Wynn 1997).
In each experiment, infants were presented with one of two trials. In one, a coherent, bounded
object was dropped behind a screen that was placed in front of the infant (object trial). In the other,
sand was poured behind a screen (material trial). In both cases the screen was removed after the
initial presentation to test the subject’s response to the disappearance of the item in question. The
results were that the infant subjects showed surprise (as measured in amount of time the infant spent
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gazing at the area where the object or material was supposed to lie) upon the outcome of the object
trial, but did not show surprise in the material trial. These experiments lend support to there being
an object tracking system within our cognitive repertoire, but not a material tracking system.
What are we to make of the fact that infants routinely fail to track instances of matter? Furthermore
we can ask a more fundamental question: when presented with a non-solid instance of matter, does
the infant perceive a non-solid instance of matter? I want to claim that this is indeed what the infant
perceives. Notice how this is a more detailed claim than that found in the literature pertaining to
infant object perception. The claim made by Carey and Xu above seems to suggest that what the
infant perceives is primarily a non-object in the standard sense of objects being three-dimensional,
coherent entities. This is an important claim, but it does not tell us much with respect to the
infant’s perception of matter instances. What I would like to do below is to attempt to fill in the
details with respect to the perception of discrete instances of matter.
The broader point to be made is that perception alone cannot account for the fact that there is a
fundamental difference between objects and non-objects, the latter of which includes materials such
as clay or sand. Rather, perception must be linked to more advanced cognitive systems which are
both flexible and specific enough to be sensitive to incoming perceptual information, yet rigid and
general such that the information that comes in is properly classified and tracked (or not tracked in
the case of a discrete instance of matter). Seen in this way, perception is not a lower level cognitive
activity that is divorced from higher level activities such as categorization. It is, instead, embedded
within cognition. Furthermore, without perception, there would be little need for categories or
concepts as well.
The Matter Concept
Here, let us take stock of what kinds of entities we need in order to recognize, re-identify, and track
collections of matter. The view taken up here is that there is a hierarchy of concepts which we must
describe in order to begin to speak about recognizing matter. We will begin by describing our more
general concept of matter.
First, there is matter which is a broad superordinate category that stands as a contrast-class to
object. When enumerating the principles that determine whether an entity falls under the matter
category, we want the principle to be sufficiently flexible to handle a wide variety of types of
matter. In addition, we must keep in mind that at least in infancy, the matter concept seems to be
underdeveloped in contrast to the object concept.
What determines matter from objects are certain irregularities of shape which are present in the
instances of the former. Matter, the concept, is attuned, in the way that our perceptual system is
attuned to perceiving objects and matter instances and not molecules, to discontinuities in shape,
which objects, as a general rule, do not present. However, there are always exceptions to general
rules which we will observe in a moment. The fact that matter corresponds to shape irregularities
means that there are different criteria which are used to recognize, re-identify, and track matter
instances.
This is an important point which Keil, Kim, and Greif develop within their chapter in Forde and
Humphreys (Eds., 2002). In their chapter, Keil et al. speak of the perceptual shunt as key to
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cognitive processing of low-level perceptual information. The shunt is claimed to be a mechanism
that channels perceptual information to different parts of the brain for subsequent higher level
cognitive processing. The idea is that in order for this process to work, our cognitive structure must
be sensitive to salient perceptual information. In Keil’s et al. (2001, p.13) words, “data can only
enter the system if it sets off primary perceptual triggers.” The attempt for us is to apply these ideas
to the perception of instances of matter.
The experiments conducted on infants point to the conclusion that objects, in the standard sense, are
assimilated according to shape. However, matter instances are assimilated according to the material
which composes them. Soja, Carey, and Spelke’s (1991) experiment included presenting infants (2
year olds) with a named object with a T-shape and a named non-solid matter instance of a novel
shape. After the infants were habituated to the two items they were shown two more sets of items.
After being shown the T-shaped object, infants tended to apply the stimulus name to a T-shaped
object made of a different material as being more similar to the original object than a collection of
separate objects made of the same material, but having a non-T-shape. However, when presented
with a matter instance of a novel shape, the infants applied the stimulus name to a differently
shaped entity made of the same material rather than a similarly shaped entity made of a different
material. This experiment shows that there is an interesting dynamic between shape and material
which is applied to differentiate matter instances from objects.
There are several questions involved in interpreting the results of this experiment. First and
foremost is the question of how the subjects are receptive to the fact that material composition is
salient in one trial and not the other. In other words, just what are they using to apply the stimulus
word and how are they using it?
I would suggest that what the subjects perceive are discrete matter instances. However, in order to
assimilate the stimulus with the target, the child must perform two different tasks at two different
levels of cognitive processing. First, she must somehow mentally extract the material composition
of the named stimulus. Also, she must have some notion that the material composition in the
material experiment is salient. Yet it is not so in the object trial. At issue is how this is performed.
The answer must be found at the top-level of conceptual formation rather than in bottom-level
perceptual experience. There are constraints which guide the mind in order to perceive instances of
matter. One such constraint was mentioned above. Shape irregularity seems to be a good candidate
for matter instance recognition. Allow me to elaborate why I single out shape irregularity as being
salient to the classification of matter.
There is, according to my interpretation of the above experiment, an important distinction to be
made between perceiving shape irregularity and using it to assimilate two matter instances to a
single name. The recognition of the fact that the named stimulus is of a novel shape signals to the
infant that the substance of which it is composed is of primary import. (Of course there are other
such signals found in surface properties, for instance texture and color distribution, which we will
set aside here.) This leads the infant to overlook differences in shape upon being asked to assimilate
names to different instances of matter. There are obvious objections to this interpretation. For
example, just how do we define a novel or irregular shape? A man is irregularly shaped in a sense.
Are we to classify a man as an instance of matter?
My first response would be to say that shape irregularity refers to asymmetry in shape. But this will
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not due for we can certainly think of counter examples. For instance a symmetrical portion of gold
is called gold and this holds irrespective of its symmetrical shape. It is interesting to consider the
following. If a semi-solid matter instance such as clay were molded into a T-shape and presented as
a named stimulus, would infants subsequently assimilate the name to targets of the same shape as in
the object trial? The current literature on infant perception (Huntley-Fenner 2001) seems to predict
that the result of such an experiment would depend upon how the named stimulus was presented.
So, if we formed the semi-solid material into a T shape prior to presentation, then infants would
assimilate the name according to shape. However, if we perhaps fashioned the material into a T-
shape before the infant’s eyes, then assimilation would take place based upon material composition.
In any event, it seems to me that it is entirely possible or even very likely that an irregular shape
marks a matter instance, however difficult it is to theoretically define.
There are two more constraints placed on the cognitive processing of matter instances which I want
to touch upon. The first is what I refer to as the uniformity constraint which tells us that there is
something peculiar about perceiving matter instances. Uniformity says that instances of matter are
in general composed of a uniform material throughout the instance. This applies especially to solid,
opaque masses such as a nugget of gold. Of course, this assumption could be dead wrong. There
could be a mass of some other mineral or metal concentrated in the center or scattered throughout.
Nevertheless, we tend to apply matter instance uniformity based upon surface uniformity. This
applies equally to translucent, non-solids such as water, even when it has been mixed with, say,
salt. The tendency is to view the mixture as being uniform throughout the instance.
Moreover, the last constraint, which delineates our perception of matter instances, is that in general
they do not present to us any significant surface divisions. In other words, objects present us with
parts at the mesoscopic level, which is the level at which we perceive. For example, cups have
handles and humans have arms. Of course, there is not a clear boundary between the handle and the
remainder of the cup, and the arm from the remainder of the human. Nevertheless, instances of
matter lack this phenomenon. From this, we seem to be much more able to mentally parse the cup
into parts than the contents that the cup contains.
What we are left with then are three constraining principles – the principle of irregular shape,
uniformity, and lack of perceptible surface divisions – which interact to give us the matter concept.
There are significant, outstanding questions that one could ask of these constraints. For instance, are
we to look upon them as necessary or sufficient conditions for the matter concept? And further, how
do they interact?
What I would like to do is to briefly articulate some of the relationships that exist among these
principles. First, let me make this observation regarding the uniformity principle. Whether an
instance of matter is uniform is not discoverable upon immediate visual perception. This sets
uniformity apart from shape irregularity and the lack of perceptible surface divisions, which are
perceived upon immediate visual inspection. What this means is that uniformity is something which
the subject derives on the basis of the other two principles. This derivation is important to the
perception of an instance of matter. This is because the perception of matter instances includes
depth information, information upon the physical properties of the instance at points that are hidden
from visual inspection. This is what distinguishes it from the perception of animals or artifacts
whose inner, physical properties are much more intricate and are available only to those with
specialized knowledge, such as biologists. So, the perception of portions of matter proceeds from
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shape irregularities and a lack of perceptible surface divisions to material uniformity throughout the
portion in question. Of course, a lack of perceptible surface divisions is more strongly connected to
material uniformity than shape irregularity is. When perceiving an instance of matter, a lack of
surface divisions implies uniformity of material throughout the instance.
What I would like to do now is to contemplate whether we have left something out of our analysis
of perceiving portions of matter. Perhaps the three principles weighed above are aspects of a more
fundamental principle that explains the perception of matter instances. I offer the following for
consideration. There is a difference of degree in what I call the three-dimensional definiteness
between instances of matter and standard objects. When perceiving a particular portion of matter
from a particular angle, it is much more difficult for the subject to mentally construct the perceptual
properties of the part that is obstructed from visual inspection than is the case with standard objects.
This is due in large part to the three principles described above. Irregular shape and the lack of
perceptible surface divisions make the determination of what is on the other side difficult. Yet,
with, for example, a T-shape object, it is not very challenging to surmise what the object would
look like if rotated. However, the uniformity principle does at least tell us what type of matter the
occluded side is made of. So, in a sense, uniformity reduces the amount of indefiniteness we have
concerning the three-dimensional view of the matter instance in question. It counteracts to a certain
extent the uncertainty with which irregular shape and lack of perceptible surface divisions leave us.
For instance, when presented with a large portion of gold, we cannot properly imagine what the
occluded section looks like based on visual perception alone. However, we do assume that gold
composes the unseen section whatever particular shape it may have.
Of course there are problems with these remarks as well. It seems as though the lesser degree of
three-dimensional definiteness applies well to certain types of matter instances. But can the same be
said of a portion of water, which given its transparency is perhaps more three-dimensionally definite
than a T-shaped object? This objection I intend the reader to consider. But it contains a point on
which I would like to focus next: the notion of types of matter.
Types of Matter
There are different types of matter, many of which we lack specific names for. First of all, there is
the heap or collection of objects at close spatial quarters such as an archipelago. This type can be
further divided into heaps which have parts of uniform shape and size such as piles of sand and
those composed of parts of all shapes and sizes, for instance a heap of garbage. Next we have semi-
solid types of matter, which include peanut butter and clay. Also, there are kinds of fluids such as
gases and parcels of air in physical geographic parlance. Furthermore, we have liquids such as
water, and finally solid kinds, for instance, gold.
What I want to suggest is that the reason we need a type classification of matter is that different
types of matter are inductively rich. This is to say that their formation facilitates important
inferences pertaining to how instances of matter behave. This is perhaps a point that is worth
emphasizing. Knowing that an instance of matter belongs to a particular type tells us something
about its physical composition. So a semi-solid mass, or to stick with our terminology, a semi-solid
instance of matter, can be divided into smaller portions that are composed of the same semi-solid
material. In addition, knowledge that a matter instance belongs to a particular type tells us
something about the behavior of the instance of matter. For example, a semi-solid instance would
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provide a certain amount of resistance upon surface contact. In addition, if we placed a semi-solid
instance on the top of an inclined plane we would not expect it to move toward the bottom. We
would expect a liquid such as water to do so, however. There are two implications to be drawn
from this observation.
I am intrigued by Pascal Boyer’s (Millikan, 1998) argument for category-specific tracking
processes. Tracking instances of a different matter type would, I theorize, involve different
processes due to different motions. Tracking a cloud of gas moving through the air is a lot different
than tracking a slab of bronze as it is being fashioned into a statue. I want to say it is different
because there seems to be a difference in the degree but not the kind of cohesion amongst the
respective types of matter to which these instances belong. In fact, we can establish a continuum of
cohesion among kinds of matter ranging from the least cohesive fluids such as smoke to the most
cohesive solid masses such as gold with semi-solids in the middle.
I also think that since different kinds of matter have different behaviors, then it can also be claimed
that discrete matter instances are more than just collections of parts. For instance, an area of water
is more than a collection of water molecules. This is because although significant chunks of
material can be added to or taken away from an instance of matter, we still view that matter
instance the same as before the change. What this seems to imply is that instances of matter bear a
significant resemblance to Aristotelian substances, at least as they are described in Book VIII of the
Metaphysics.
What bothers me about this claim is that there is a problem with respect to Aristotelian substantial
change. Aristotle recognized that although an entity may change, we still acknowledge the changed
entity as being identical to the entity which existed before the change. There is something out there
in the world and in the entity in question which causes this phenomenon. For Aristotle, it is this
something that is matter. In Book VII, Chapter 1 of the Metaphysics, line 1042 a 32, we read the
following: “But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is
something which underlies the changes.”
The problem of applying this principle to an instance of matter rests in the following. Imagine a
scenario in which we have a quantity of water in a glass. We then take the glass and pour some
amount of the water out, leaving us a smaller quantity of water (which we will designate Q1)
remaining in the glass. Next, some new water is poured into the same glass. Finally, we pour
another amount of water out leaving us another quantity of water (designated as Q2), which is
exactly the same amount as (Q1). The question arises whether the water that remains in the glass at
(Q2) is the same as that at (Q1). We really cannot be certain that the water at (Q1) stayed at the
bottom during the course of the second out-pouring, or that some molecules somehow moved into
the amount which was poured out. In sum, we cannot determine whether the whole or any part of
(Q2) is identical to (Q1) in which case there seems to be no causal foundation for us to call the
(Q2) water the same as the (Q1) water.
But we would be correct in calling the (Q2) water identical to the (Q1) water and this not because
they have identical quantities. Rather, their identity is based on two considerations. First of all, they
are uniform wholes and this is true regardless of how many molecules of (Q2) are different from
(Q1). Secondly, the two quantities display identical behaviors, for example, each react in the same
way upon coming into contact with something else. The glass holds both in the same way. This is
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in addition to the other perceptible physical properties such as color, which are used in
identification. They are the same type of matter, but are the instances the same? I want to claim that
they are because they are of the same type in addition to being the same quantity. Whether or not
they have the exact same molecules we leave to the scientist to determine.
But one obvious objection to these observations is that we could be completely wrong about calling
the two quantities the same. Suppose it was not water which was poured into the glass but some
chemical that bears a striking resemblance to it. In which case at (Q2) we have some sort of water-
chemical mixture that differs from (Q1) which was entirely composed of water. Here we have two
different types without even knowing it.
This is certainly a serious objection. But the key is to notice that it misses the point that I wanted
to make. The point is to discover how we re-identify matter instances across change. The objection
cites the fallibility of our knowledge. The fact that our knowledge can be wrong is a separate issue
from how, in fact, we do come to identify and assimilate. It is the case that we do identify entities
as being the same. We do track entities across time. We need to do so in order to survive. How we
perform these tasks is a different observation than the observation that we could be wrong. Besides,
I could be equally wrong in believing that I am a philosopher. Perhaps I am a victim of a deception.
To which I reply that perhaps this is true, but it is highly unlikely.
The Material Object Concept and Material Objects
Before we proceed, I call attention to the fact that thus far we have been careful to speak of matter
instances. This is because it is important to notice the differences between discrete instances of
matter and what is known in the literature on infant perception as standard objects. These
differences are ontological. What I wish to do now is to speak of the conceptualization of matter
instances. For this reason, I will use the term material object instead of matter instance. This is
meant to reflect that just as we need an object concept to track objects, we also need a material
object concept to track material objects. However, let me make clear that a material object refers to
a discrete instance of matter. From now on I will use the terms ‘material object’ and ‘matter
instance’ or some variation of the latter interchangeably to refer to particular portions of matter.
With this in mind what remains is a description of the material object concept and material objects.
Specifically, we should ask just what are material object concepts, why do we need them, and how
are they formed?
Basically, what is meant by the material object concept is the cognitive representation of material
objects that is utilized during cognitive processing. They are collections of special properties that
distinguish material objects from standard objects. Surface texture and color seem to be two such
properties to which material object concepts must be receptive. We need material object concepts in
order to re-identify and track an enormous range of possible individual material objects.
What is of particular difficulty when devising a strategy to deal with a theory of matter is the
amazing array of possible material objects that could exist in the world. Somehow a comprehensive
theory must be able not to explain them all, but to accommodate a large majority of them. Take for
example a heap of similar objects such as tennis balls. According to what was said above, this
would be a material object. After all it resembles a heap of sand. But even if it is a material object
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how can we know this? Texture and color don’t seem to tell us anything different in the case of a
heap of tennis balls than a single tennis ball does.
First, we know it is a different object from a single tennis ball not because of color or texture. The
salient feature seems to be the irregular pattern of edges which the heap presents to the observer. As
the visual system builds the primal sketch of the entity in the sense of Marr (1982), the viewer is
presented with an irregular collection of edges which outline it. Contrast this with a single tennis
ball, which presents a comparatively regular set of edges. Second, we know the heap is a material
object because it has a certain behavior; it reacts a certain way upon surface contact. We know, for
instance, that taking a ball from the bottom of the heap will probably have consequences for those
balls above it, even those balls that are not in immediate contact with it.
But we may ask why we need material object concepts at all? There are two reasons for this. First
our material object concepts must be able to capture and preserve properties that distinguish among
the different types of matter. Secondly a material object concept must also capture specific
properties of particular matter instances.
Convergence
What I would like to do now is to connect the entities that we have discussed in order to form a
coherent explanation of material object perception. The strategy is what I call convergence, which is
one that attempts to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches to explaining the mystery of
material cognition. The mystery is how people can easily recognize and re-identify material objects
given the infinite variety of shapes and sizes they may have. To begin, I will attempt to clarify the
explanatory strategy of convergence and attempt to situate such a strategy within the literature on
cognition and perception.
Traditionally there are two approaches regarding human conceptual development which are referred
to above by the terms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. Top-down approaches are committed to the
assumption that our concepts are formed independent of human-world interaction. One variant of a
top-down approach is conceptual nativism which holds that we are born with at least some, if not
all, of the concepts we have during the course of our respective lifetimes. On the other hand,
bottom-up approaches are committed to the assumption that our concepts develop out of human-
world interaction. The term ‘bottom-up approach’ is an umbrella term for all varieties of
empiricism. The strategy of convergence is meant to simultaneously acknowledge such assumptions
and also to set them aside. I would argue that setting these assumptions aside is important for two
reasons. First of all, the debate between empiricism and nativism, despite its rich philosophical
history which is too long to report in this article, may in fact be a diversion from what we should
be seeking an explanation for. Namely, we should be seeking an explanation for human-world
interaction, for without such an explanation the debate between empiricists and nativists would be
incomprehensible. Secondly, and along such lines, we should be working toward building an
ontology which exists independently of any assumptions like those made by the empiricists and
nativists. The strategy offered below, that of convergence, marks the very start of such an endeavor.
I will focus on our formation of material object concepts, which are used to track specific instances
of matter. We may ask how material object concepts are formed. My view is that they are formed
through a union of conceptual constraints and perceptual information.
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First of all, the matter concept is a collection of properties to which the perception of matter
instances must be attuned. We have tried to find these properties above. These properties play a
major role in determining which objects are to be placed into the material object class. However
important these properties are in the recognition of material objects, they do not provide us with the
ability to single out specific instances of matter.
In order to have specific material object concepts that track specific matter instances we also need
lower level perceptual information. What is meant here by lower level perceptual information is
information about shape, size, location, etc. that is specific to this area of water, for example.
Thus the claim is that our material object concepts, which are used to track specific instances of
matter, are formed where the properties of the matter concept and lower-level perceptual
information converge.
The Material-Object Concept – A Test Case
Now let us take the time to test some of the ideas included above in a test case. The case is
designed to be difficult in order to see how well the ideas discussed so far withstand some
significant pressure.
Let us imagine we have in front of us two entities. One entity is a rock of a particular shape and
color. The second entity has the exact same shape and size as the first, but it is obvious due to its
distinct physical properties that it is gold. So, the first object we refer to as ‘a rock’, a count noun;
while the second we refer to as ‘gold’, a mass noun.
What is the true difference between an object and a material object? In this instance we have two
entities with the same surface properties of shape and texture. Further, they can be said to have the
same behaviors in that both react identically to surface contact and both are coherent in the same
way. In addition, if one is irregularly shaped, then so is the other. Moreover, let us suppose that
their shape is such that it does not indicate any distinct mesoscopic parts. In sum, the constraints
meant to distinguish between matter and object seem to apply to both entities. So, the distinction
seems to break down at this point.
However, I argue that there is indeed a difference between the material object, gold, and the object,
rock. The difference rests in the composition of the entities and the uniformity assumption discussed
above. In the case of gold, we assume that the color gives us information about what the entity is
composed of throughout its extension in space. In fact, we would be truly shocked if we found out
that the gold on the surface was just a patina. Notice that if we did make this discovery the piece of
gold would become instead a gold covered rock. This applies even in cases not involving precious
metals where there is a desire for material uniformity, such as coal.
Further, it is uninteresting to apply the uniformity constraint to the rock. Instead, we would be more
interested if we were told that the rock was not uniform throughout and contained sections of gold
scattered within it; in which case it would still be called a rock, but it would be one with scattered
portions of gold within it. The point is that speculating about and coming to know of the innards of
the rock does not affect its status as a rock as much as in the case of gold. Also, we have different
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names for both types of objects. We do not call gold a ‘gold rock’ but we have special names, such
as ‘gold nugget’ or ‘piece of gold’ for a significant portion of gold.
Next, we may inquire as to what degree this object/material object distinction is captured by the
linguistic mass/count distinction. The problem is that language does not encapsulate this distinction
in its entirety. The difficulty is that ‘gold’ can be used to refer to a type of matter which is defined
by the properties that gold has. However, it can also be used to refer to a particular material object
composed of gold. Somehow we know that when a miner shouts, “I’ve found gold”, he is referring
to some particular portion of gold with boundaries as yet to be discovered. Yet, similarly, we know
that when a milk-drinker says that, “milk is a good source of calcium”, he is referring to a type of
matter and not to some particular material object. It is my contention that a major part of how we
can decipher these different referents is that we have an order or hierarchy of concepts which help
us to understand our world. And just as there are higher-order constraints that aid our
understanding, these same constraints help us to decode and make sense of our language.
A Final Objection
Before we conclude, let us consider yet one more objection. The objection is provided by Millikan
in her 1998 article “A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs and Real Kinds: More
Mama, More Milk, and More Mouse.” Millikan’s argument challenges some of the core
assumptions underlying the claims found in this paper.
First, according to Millikan, concepts are not constructed by attending to properties. Millikan’s aim
is to provide a nondescriptionist account of concept formation. Concepts are not formed through the
listing of specific properties. This is because properties cannot be used as the basis of individuation.
Rather, the extensions of concepts, the instances that fall under the concept, are determined much
more primitively through a process along the lines of what philosophers of language would call rigid
designation. In other words, concepts do not describe entities; instead, they point to or enumerate
entities. Indeed Millikan’s analysis of concepts proceeds along the lines of an analysis of how the
nouns we use in our language refer. This relates to her view on how the use of language comes to
influence our concepts. She claims, “Having substance concepts need not depend on knowing
words, but language interacts with substance concepts, completely transforming the conceptual
repertoire” (Millikan 1998, p. 55).
Secondly, it is important to realize what Millikan classifies as substances. Substances include
“stuffs” such as milk and gold, individuals such as Bill Clinton, Mama, and the Empire State
Building, and real kinds. Examples of real kinds include Rosch’s (1975) basic level categories such
as mouse and house which children learn first (Millikan 1998).
There is a reason why Millikan includes such various items under the substance category.
Specifically she wants to claim that there is not a genuine ontological distinction to be made
between material objects, or in her terminology, stuff, such as milk, and objects, such as mouse.
Here is Millikan (1998, p.56) describing the relationship between concepts and ontology:
My claim will be that these apparently quite different types of concepts have an identical root
structure and that this is possible because the various kinds of “substances” I have listed have
an identical ontological structure when considered at a suitably abstract level.
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The concepts mouse and milk have the same structure, so Millikan claims, as concepts of
individuals like Mama and Bill Clinton. The claim is that stuff concepts, such as gold, are rooted in
our cognitive structure because they are conceptually and ontologically similar to individual objects.
Millikan makes another point that is worth mentioning here. She claims that there is a distinction to
be made between a substance concept and the properties that a substance is known to possess. She
states:
It is because knowledge of the properties of substances is often used in the process of
identifying them that it is easy to confuse having a concept of a substance with having
knowledge of properties that would identify it (Millikan 1998, p. 63).
So, in sum, the acquisition of substance concepts involves storing information about substances and
associating this information with the correct set of properties.
A Brief Response
Allow me to respond to Millikan by noting some of the consequences of her position. First of all
her position seems to be much more complex than the one offered in the body of this paper.
Further, this complexity is found in the way the mind perceives the world, not in the world itself.
Millikan’s view seems to contradict the empirical findings relating to infant perception cited above.
This is a point that Paul Bloom emphasizes in his Open Peer Commentary response to Millikan
(1998). Infants applied names for objects very differently from names for stuff or material objects as
seen in the experiment conducted by Soja et al. (1991).
Secondly, it is not clear to me how we are to link our information of substances to the correct list
of properties. In order to do so, it would seem we would have to think of an additional cognitive
mechanism. This would be in addition to the perceptual shunt talked about above which is
necessary to pick out the salient properties of objects and material objects alike. Under Millikan’s
view we would need some sort of structure to connect the important properties to our information of
substances. Further this structure, it would seem, must translate our perception of properties and our
information on substances into a uniform format or perhaps language. It appears as though Millikan
is committed to some form of the position that the mind is a general processor, which holds that the
mind employs a general strategy and/or language across tasks.
The consequence of this view is that online processing, the kind of cognitive processing that
operates on perceptual information, becomes inordinately difficult and slow. This is because
perceptual information, our knowledge of properties, and our substance concepts must be joined
together and subsequently processed. Again, this contradicts the fact that infants readily and easily
distinguish between objects and material objects. In addition, if perceiving substances occurs the
way Millikan describes, then it is hard to see how readily we can make distinctions that are relevant
to our survival. When I cross a street and notice that there is a bus rapidly moving toward me, I do
not link bus properties with bus substance. Instead, I do know quite early in my perception of the
bus that it is an object and furthermore has a likely trajectory which, if I don’t take immediate
action, will threaten my survival. Millikan overlooks the fact that perception, to be of any use to us,
must not only be accurate and consistent more often than not, but also must be agile and quick
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enough to deliver real-time information to cognitive systems of more sophistication.
A simpler explanation is available if we recognize that there are different entities in the world,
ontologically speaking. Two such entities include objects and material objects. The world is
complex. However, the way ordinary people conceptualize the world is much less so.
Conclusion
In sum, we have attempted to notice what place perception has, not only within our cognitive
capacity, but within our daily interaction with the world around us. Our concepts must be amenable
to perceptual information in order for us to make sense of the world in which we live.
Thus, the claim is that we must utilize both a top-down and bottom-up processing mechanism in
order to classify matter into types. Also we need this explanation to build material object concepts
which are used to track particular material objects located within the visual field. Also, we’ve
proposed three general constraints: uniformity, shape irregularity, and absence of perceptible surface
division on the mesoscopic scale. We also considered whether these three may be aspects of another
general constraint, which we referred to as three-dimensional definiteness which limits material
objects to having a uniform material composition throughout. These filter down to the material
object concept level and facilitate the classification of matter into types. However, they don’t
provide us with specific types. Rather, specificity comes from the perception of material objects.
The representation of material objects is sensitive to texture, color, and irregularities in shape which
material objects possess.
There are two reasons for treating material object concepts. First, they are inductively rich and their
processing is sufficiently complex. Different types of material object behave differently upon
surface contact. There seems to be a continuum of coherence, which explains this. Second, this
richness is not entirely captured by language, specifically by the mass-count distinction.
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